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Abstract: 
We employ a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting (Data Envelopment Analysis, 
DEA)  to  disentangle  the  proximate  sources  of  labour  productivity  growth  in  41  nations 
between  1929  and  1950  by  decomposing  productivity  growth  into  four  components: 
technological  change;  efficiency  catch-up  (movements  towards  the  production  frontier), 
capital  accumulation  and  human  capital  accumulation.  We  show  that  efficiency  catch-up 
generally  explains  productivity  growth,  whereas  technological  change  and  factor 
accumulation  were  limited  and  distorted  by  the  effects  of  war.  War  clearly  hampered 
efficiency. Moreover, an unbalanced ratio of human capital to physical capital (a gap to the 
technological leader) was crucial for efficiency catching-up. 
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1.  Introduction 
Growth accounting has long been an important tool to disentangle the proximate sources of 
economic  growth  (Solow:  1957,  Griliches  and  Jorgenson:  1967).  However,  the  method 
requires several assumptions about perfect competition in markets, the functional form of the 
production technology in use, Hicks-neutral technological change and constant factor shares 
in income. The majority of growth accounting studies has assumed that output is produced 
according  to  a  two-input  Cobb-Douglas  aggregate  production  function.  This  reliance  was 
questioned by Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000), who found that they could reject the Cobb-
Douglas specification using a panel of 82 countries over a 28 year period. Furthermore, cross-
country evidence suggests large variances in labour shares of countries at various stages of 
development (Gollin: 2000). In addition, growth accounting results tend to be biased in the 
presence of inefficiency in the production process (Grosskopf: 1993).  
Given some of the above-mentioned draw-backs, Kumar and Russell (2002) argue in 
favor  of  using  a  non-parametrical  approach  to  growth  accounting  that  neither  requires 
assumptions  about  absence  of  market  imperfection  nor  about  the  specific  form  of  the 
production technology. In this study, we follow their reasoning and argue in addition that the 
notion of relative efficiency, or inefficiency, should be taken into account when performing 
historical growth accounting exercises, in particular during times of disintegration and war.  
In  such  turbulent  situations  institutional  frameworks,  access  to  world  markets,  war 
participation and the general economic environment are more likely to influence how efficient 
a country can transform the use of inputs into outputs.    4 
The  interwar  and  immediate  post-war  periods  are  interesting  to  study  from  this 
perspective  since  this  period  saw  limited  technological  diffusion  as  countries  became 
increasingly  closed  from  world  markets.  In  addition,  the  period  was  one  of  very  modest 
capital growth in a majority of countries. In technological leading nations as USA and UK 
capital per worker hardly accumulated at all. In general, the period 1929-1950 saw the least 
capital  growth  per  worker  since  1890  (see  Maddison:  1995).  Nevertheless,  there  were 
increases in labour productivity during this period. Countries like Sweden, South Africa and 
Portugal nearly doubled in labour productivity between 1929 and 1950 whereas increases in 
Canada, Finland, Norway, Brazil, USA and New Zealand were substantial as well (around 50 
percent). Foreman-Peck (1995, pp. 182-83) notes the paradox in that declining international 
trade, unemployment and general instability was accompanied by considerable real income 
increases in many countries. Foreman-Peck argues that prosperity of the time period was 
based  upon  the  adoption  of  the  revolutionary  technologies  from  the  late  19
th  century, 
especially the applications of electricity, the internal combustion engine and the factory mode 
of production that offered scopes for catching-up.  
However,  the  scope  for  catching-up  could  be  dependent  on  the  general  “social 
capability” of a nation, as argued by Abramowitz (1986). The general social capability of a 
nation  can  be  seen  as  a  component  of  human  capital  which  can  abridge  the  process  of 
technology  adoption for late-comers.  At the start of the 20
th century the rich nations had 
converged in terms of elementary-school enrolments and many of the poorer countries had 
started  to  expand  mass  primary  schooling  (Goldin:  2001,  p.265).  These  educated  cohorts 
started to enter into the workforce during the 1920’s and 1930’s and could have affected the 
general propensity for catching-up in certain nations, despite the world disintegration.  
In this article we aim at clarifying the inter-war growth puzzle, especially focusing on 
the sources of catching-up and on the growth effects from human capital. There is a strong   5 
case for measuring inter-war growth from 1929 to 1950 by means of non-parametrical growth 
accounting that do not require perfect market assumptions but take factor accumulation and 
efficiency changes into account. Moreover, we argue that the process of catching-up can be 
measured as increases in efficiency relative to the best practise nations in the sample. We also 
investigate  the  exogenous  determinants  of  such  catching-up  effects,  hypothesising  that 
institutional frameworks and  war participation  mattered, but also that  countries with high 




2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
The study utilizes Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which is a data-driven non-parametric 
linear programming method that neither requires any a priori specifications of the functional 
form of the technology nor any assumption about market structure and absence of market 
imperfections.  It  does  however  require  an  assumption  of  the  returns  to  scale  of  the 
technology. 
 This  non-parametrical  approach  to  growth  accounting  was  pioneered  by  Färe  et  al. 
(1994) who decomposed the labor productivity increases in 17 OECD countries 1977-1988 
into  technical  change  and  efficiency  change.  The  decomposition  has  recently  extended  to 
incorporate  capital  accumulation  (Kumar  and  Russell:  2002,  Los  and  Timmer:  2005)  and 
human capital accumulation (Henderson and Russell: 2005) as sources of labor productivity 
growth in a sample of countries post 1965.   
More formally, assume that the production set is spanned by a set of input and output 
vectors. More formally, let  { }
M N R ) , (
+ Î = Y Y X . That is, the set of N inputs, measured by the 
vector X, can produce M outputs, measured by vector Y. All efficient production plans lie on   6 
the  boundary  (frontier)  of  the  production  set  Y   (Debreu:  1959).  The  relative  efficiency 
scores,  l are calculated from a set of observations  { } n i y x i i ,..., 1 ); , ( ) =  by solving a linear 
programming  problem,  where  x  and  y  denotes  the  sample  input  and  output  vectors, 
respectively, and n denotes the number of observations in the sample (Färe et al.: 1994b). 
More  precisely,  the  estimated  DEA  scores{ } n i i i ,..., 1 ; ˆ ˆ 1 = =
- q l   of  the  attainable  set  Y are 
defined as: 
 
[ ] , ..., , 1 ; ˆ ) ( sup ) ( ˆ
, n i i y x y x i i i i i = Î = y q q q                                        (1) 
 
where  the  subset  y ˆ   is  spanned  by  the  sample  input  and  output  vectors 
{ } . ,..., 1 ; ) , ( ˆ n i y x
M N
i i = Â Î =
+ y  The index is the inverse of the maximal proportional amount 
that output yi can be expanded given the input quantities xi and the existing technology.  
 
2.2 Decomposition Analysis 
In order to disentangle the proximate forces of labour productivity growth, we follow the 
methodological  approach  of  Henderson  and  Russell  (2005,  pp.1178-1180).  Exploiting  the 
constant returns to scale assumption, we use the obtained productivity frontiers and relative 
efficiency  scores  to  decompose  productivity  growth  into  four  components:  technological 
change  (shifts  of  the  production  frontier);  technological  catch-up  (movements  towards  or 
away from the production frontier), capital accumulation and human capital accumulation 
(movements along the production frontier) between our benchmark years. Disentangling the 
contributions from technological change, capital and human capital accumulation are standard 
to growth accounting analyses, although we measure them without any assumptions about the 
functional form of the  production technology.  More importantly  however, the  addition of   7 
relative efficiency enables us to analyse the catching-up and decline of nations compared to 
the technological frontier as well.  
Following Henderson and Russell (2005, pp. 1178-1180) let  ) ˆ ( ˆ b b k y  and  ) ˆ ( ˆ c c k y  denote 
output per efficiency unit of worker and eb and ec the estimated efficiency indices in the 
current, c, and base period, b, respectively.  By definition, the potential output per efficiency 
unit of worker in the two periods are  ) ˆ ( b b k y = b b b e k y / ) ˆ ( ˆ  and  ) ˆ ( c c k y = c c c e k y / ) ˆ ( ˆ . We can 
therefore write the ratio of labor productivity in the current to the base period as the product 
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Now, define the potential output per efficiency unit of worker at the current period capital 
per worker ratios, given the technology that was in existence at the base period, as  ) ˆ ( c b k y . 
Similarly define  ) /(
~
b c c c H L K k = , thus the capital per worker ratio in the current period under 
the counterfactual assumption that the human capital augmentation did not change since the 
base  period.  Multiplying  the  top  and  bottom  of  (2)  with  )
~
( ) ˆ ( c b c b k y k y ´   results  in  the 
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Growth  in  labour  productivity  t t t L Y y / =   can  in  turn  be  decomposed  into  the  growth  of 
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Combining  equation  3  and  4  yields  the  following  decomposition  of  labour  productivity 
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HACC KACC TECH EFF ´ ´ ´ =  
corresponding to movements towards or away from the productivity frontier (the efficiency 
change, EFF); the shift of the productivity frontier at the current periods capital per efficiency 
unit  of  worker  levels  (technical  change,  TECH);  the  capital  accumulation  along  the  base 
periods productivity frontier (KACC); and the effects of human capital accumulation (HACC).  
This  decomposition  measures  technological  change  at  current  period’s  capital  per 
efficiency unit of worker levels and capital accumulation along the base period’s productivity 
frontier. However, the composition can also be made the other way around (thus technical 
change at the base periods capital levels and capital accumulation along the current frontier). 
The two decompositions will not yield the same result unless technology is Hicks neutral, i.e. 
augmenting capital and labour by the same proportion at different capital per worker ratios.
1 It 
shall however be emphasized that this problem is endemic to the task of growth accounting 
and is usually resolved by simply assuming Hicks neutrality of technical change. 
                                                 
1 See Henderson and Russell (2005, p. 1179) for a more detailed description of the path-dependency of the two 
decompositions.    9 
Following Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2005) we resolve the 
ambiguity of choosing between the two decompositions by taking the Fisher average of the 
decomposed factors in the following way: 
 
2 / 1 2 / 1 2 / 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
c b c b c b
b
c HACC HACC KACC KACC TECH TECH EFF
y
y
× ´ × ´ × ´ =      (6) 
 
3. Data 
For this study we have put together a unique data set of GDP, labour, capital and human 
capital for 41 countries around the world for the benchmark years 1929, 1938 and 1950. We 
have collected GDP and labour figures from a number of sources, however relying foremost 
on the Maddison: 1995 dataset.  
Since internationally comparable data on physical capital stocks is unavailable for a 
large number of countries before 1965 we estimate the amount of physical capital on basis of 
energy consumption data taken from Darmstadter (1971). This strategy has originally been 
developed for estimating socialist and communist countries’ physical capital (Gregory: 1975) 
but we show that it can also be applied to early 20
th century “white spots”. The advantage of 
measuring  capital  stocks  from  energy  consumption  data    is  first  of  all  that  data  is 
internationally comparable, thus avoiding the issues of differing average service lives and 
depreciation speeds in capital stocks (O’Mahoney: 1996) and problems of sectorial deflation. 
Secondly, energy consumption provides a direct estimate of the share of the capital stock that 
enters into useful production, which makes our estimate lie closer to the notion of capital 
services than capital stock. We believe that this measure is even more accurate in growth 
accounting studies. See appendix A1 for a detailed description of the capital stocks.    10 
For human capital stock estimates we follow the approach of obtaining human capital 
augmentation factors by Hall and Jones (1999). The approach builds on the Psacharopoulos 
(1994) world wide survey of the returns to education and Lindert’s (2006) data on schooling 
enrolment (and the suggestions for interpolation by Labuske and Baten 2006), from which we 
estimated average years of schooling in each population for our benchmark years. In appendix 
A2, the estimation of human capital augmentation factors is described.  
The average increase in the augmentation factors in our sample was 6 percent between 
1924  and  1945  and  there  was  a  weak  convergence  in  human  capital  accumulation,  with 
France and Sweden showing very modest increases and the largest increases in Japan, Chile 
and Finland (16 percent). Figure 5 displays the calculated human augmentation factors for all 
41 countries in 1925 and 1945. Human capital increases were also large in countries like 
South Africa, Turkey and Sri Lanka.  The French human capital evolution stands out in this 
figure, mainly because of its special demographic development. Lindert (2004a) found that 
the French schooling rate before WWI was often underestimated, because earlier studies did 
not take the rapid decline of the number of children in the school age over the 19
th century 
(age 5-14) into account. Lindert corrected those figures, and estimated a higher value. Those 
pre-war schooling investments led to a elevated number of school-year of the labour force 
(age  25+)  in  the  1920s.  In  contrast,  the  post-WWI  government  in  France  had  substantial 
economic problems, which – among other factors - led to more average schooling investments 
in the early 1920s, which filtered into a lower stock of school years available in the adult 
labour force of the 1940s. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Technical frontiers   11 
Figure 1 and 2 shows the estimated production frontiers in 1929 and 1950 respectively. Figure 
1 displays the frontier estimated using only capital and labour as inputs whereas figure 2 
shows the frontier after we have included the human capital augmentation factors. Note that 
the scale of the production frontier changes after we measure capital and output per efficiency 
unit of labour. The assumption of constant returns to scale and labour augmentation of the 
labour force allow us to display the constructed frontiers in two-dimensional space. Several 
features stand out from the figures. First of all, we can identify the technological leading 
nations as the countries that determine the frontier in every benchmark year. We find that 
United States lies on the technological frontier at different capital levels for all benchmark 
years. This remains true both if we include human capital and if we do not. It appears that our 
identification of the frontier countries (the technological leaders) remains relatively robust to 
the human capital inclusion. In 1929 Argentina, Netherlands, and United States determined 
the production frontier at relatively high capital per worker levels, both with and without the 
inclusion of human capital. Switzerland was however excluded from the production frontier in 
1929 after we included human capital in the production process. In 1950 the same countries 
determined the frontier using both specifications. Apart from the case of Switzerland in 1929, 
this indicates that the frontier countries were fully exploiting the returns to human capital and 
that their technology remained “best practise” even after controlling for the higher value of 
their workforce due to education. 
At low capital per worker levels the frontier is determined by Thailand and Sri Lanka in 
1929 both with and without human capital inclusion. At these low capital per worker levels 
the frontier does not shift at all during the investigated time period, showing that technology 
was non-neutral and that there were limited scopes for technological change for the least 
productive nations in the time period.    12 
When investigating how the frontier shifted over time, we find that including human 
capital into the productivity analysis severely modifies the shifts of the production frontier 
(the expansion of potential output, which can be interpreted as technical change). Between 
1929 and 1950 the frontier shifted by a third at medium capital per worker levels when we do 
not control for human capital, but only by a fifth at medium levels after the human capital 
inclusion.  Thus,  slightly  less  than  half  of  the  effects  of  technological  change  could  be 
attributed to human capital increases at medium capital per worker levels between 1929 and 
1950.  
We have also calculated the production function for the benchmark year 1938, but we 
find that the frontier does not shift at all between 1929 and 1938 after we include human 
capital,  showing  the  negative  effects  that  the  Depression  had  on  potential  output  (after 
controlling  for human capital accumulation).  
 
4. 2 Technical Frontiers and Relative Efficiency, with and without human capital 
Table 1 lists the efficiency indices for our 41 countries in 1929 and 1950 calculated under the 
assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale.  For  comparison  purposes  we  present  the  relative 
inefficiency  of  countries  both  with  and  without  the  inclusion  of  human  capital  in  the 
production function. Countries with efficiency indices of 1 it are fully efficient given their 
relative inputs and thus determining the technological frontier at the given time period. As 
seen from the table, the inclusion of human capital improves the efficiency of the majority of 
countries (those in bold text), especially in 1950. This finding points to the fact that low levels 
of human capital relative to the frontier countries can explain a substantial amount of the 
estimated country-level inefficiency and that the importance of this gap was growing with 
time.    13 
Some countries look better in terms of efficiency after we took their low human capital 
into account: The largest difference after accounting for human capital in 1950 were found in 
South Africa, Mexico, Nicaragua and Chile. In contrast, the efficiency of Japan and Hungary 
declines after we include human capital in 1950, meaning that these two countries did not 
fully utilize their stocks of human capital efficiently in relation to similar countries. This 
might have been a result of the war events taking place directly before 1950.  
The finding that the efficiency in most countries improves after we include human 
capital  indicates  that  low  levels  of  human  capital  could  explain  parts  of  the  estimated 
inefficiency levels. Thus, there is a level effect from human capital to the level of relative 
inefficiency. However, in order to assess the growth contributions from changes in capital, 
capital, efficiency and technical shifts, we continue with the decomposition analysis outlined 
in section 2.2. 
 
4. 3  Decomposition Analysis 
In table 2 the results from the decomposition analysis outlined in section 2.2 are given. We 
have carried out the decomposition between 1929 and 1950 for all of our 41 sample countries 
and for comparison purposes we present the result both with and without human capital. As 
seen  from  the  averages  of  the  relative  contributions  to  labour  productivity  growth  at  the 
bottom row of the table, the 41 countries increased labour productivity by 24 percent on 
average, but were relatively falling behind the productivity frontier as the relative efficiency 
contribution  was  –  19  %  on  average  when  we  do  not  include  human  capital  in  the 
decomposition. The moderate contribution of technical change comes from the fact that the 
frontier shifted relatively  little during our time period.  In addition, controlling for human 
capital cuts the contribution of technical  change by  a third. This shows that some of the 
modest shifts of the frontier could be accommodated for by quality improvements of the   14 
workforce.  Adding  human  capital  to  the  production  specification  severely  modifies  the 
growth contribution of capital accumulation, probably because capital per efficiency unit of 
labour decreased in many countries between 1929 and 1950.  
Thus,  between  1929  and  1950  the  relative  growth  contributions  of  capital 
accumulation and technical change appear to have been modest. This fits well with the fact 
that the world was disintegrated and turbulent. In addition many countries were falling behind 
the productivity frontier, showing how world disintegration and wars contributed to efficiency 
collapses in many countries. The strongest positive effect comes from the fact that human 
capital continued to increase as the educated cohorts of the 1910’s and 1920’s entered into the 
workforce. The effects of human capital accumulation were however counteracted by slow 
capital accumulation and efficiency collapses, for example in Poland, Japan, and China. It 
seems that although human capital had strong relative growth effects during this time period, 
the  effects  were  counterbalanced  by  slow  capital  accumulation  and  efficiency  collapses, 
features  that  can  mainly  be  attributed  to  the  specific  conditions  of  our  investigated  time 
period.  
Table 3 summarizes the correlations between the four decomposed sources with labour 
productivity growth between 1929 and 1950.  
 
Table 3. Correlations between labour productivity growth and the decomposed sources 1929-50 
EFF  TECH  KACC  HACC 
0.68  0.14  0.57  -0.42 
 
The first element in the table displays that efficiency changes correlate very well with 
productivity  increases.  Thus,  although  the  majority  of  countries  were  falling  behind  the 
production frontier, there were a few growth miracles that caught-up with the technological   15 
leaders  and  increased  output.  Sweden  and  South  Africa  show  strong  efficiency  and 
productivity increases, but we find similar patterns in New Zealand, Norway, Canada, Mexico 
and Switzerland.   
The  next  element  indicates  that  the  relative  contributions  of  frontier  shifts  are 
ambiguous. As mentioned earlier, the frontier did not shift at all between 1929 and 1938 and 
the shift was modest for the full period, especially at low capital per efficiency unit of worker 
levels. Thus, we find low contribution from technology in Thailand and Sri Lanka, since the 
technological frontier hardly shifted at their capital per efficiency unit of worker levels. In the 
rest of the sample, the shift of the frontier at various capital per worker levels does not show 
any  systematic  correlation  to  productivity  increases.  Rather,  it  seems  that  the  movements 
towards  or  away  from  the  frontier,  the  “catching-up  forces”,  were  more  important  in 
explaining productivity increases.  
In the two last columns in table 3 we correlate capital and human capital accumulation 
against  labour  productivity  growth.    The  rather  strong  correlation  between  capital 
accumulation and productivity growth designates that although the size of the relative effects 
of capital accumulation was relatively small and sometimes even negative, countries with 
positive  gains  from  capital  also  experienced  productivity  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
growth effects from human capital increases were great in magnitude, but the most prevalent 
effects were found in countries with collapsing productivity and efficiency levels. The story is 
consistent with the evidence from Poland, Japan and China. Human capital accumulation was 
the  only  productive  accumulation  force  that  was  relatively  undistorted  in  countries  were 
capital was destroyed and efficiency collapsed. However, increases in human capital alone 
could not drive productivity increases.  
This  section  concludes  that  although  the  contributions  from  factor  accumulation 
played a role, the accumulation of capital was slow. In many cases capital per efficiency unit   16 
of worker actually decreased. Moreover, technological change took place at a slow rate and 
shifts in the production frontier do not appear to explain why some countries were still able to 
achieve  labour  productivity  growth.  Rather,  we  find  that  this  period  was  one  in  which 
inefficiency was a substantial element in the production process and that many countries were 
falling behind the production frontier. In addition, efficiency increases correlate well with 
labour  productivity  growth,  indicating  that  we  need  to  understand  the  determinants  of 
efficiency  change,  especially  in  a  time  period  of  slow  factor  accumulation  and  limited 
technological change.  
 
4.4 What determines efficiency in the de-globalisation and war period? 
In this section we explore potential determinants of efficiency growth or decline between 
1929 and 1950. We will use regression analysis in order to find the determinants of efficiency 
change. This approach, where efficiency is estimated in the first stage and thereafter regressed 
upon various exogenous covariates is generally known as the two-stage approach (see for 
example  Ray  2004).  We  are  particularly  interested  in  phenomena  which  might  have  kept 
markets from working, hence retarding the adoption of new technologies.  
We imagine that a protectionist policy might be such a force in the interwar period: if 
a country lifts its tariff barriers to abnormally high levels, it might not only benefit from 
“beggar your neighbour” effects, but it might also deter the imports of capital good and new 
technologies. For example, the extreme cases of high tariffs were the countries Colombia, 
Portugal and Brazil. Argentina’s import-substitution policy in the 1940s and 1950s is another 
example  of  tariffs  driving  up  equipment  prices  and  depriving  the  industry  of  technology 
import (Taylor: 1992).   
However,  as  argued  by  Collins  and  Williamson  (2001,  pp.  77),  tariffs  can  have 
different effects on the relative price of capital goods depending on the time and the place.   17 
Collins and Williamson investigate the connection between tariffs and the relative price of 
capital in 11 OECD countries 1870-1950 and find that tariffs generally favoured capital goods 
relative to consumer goods to the extend that they distorted relative prices prior to 1950. Thus, 
the effects on tariffs on efficiency and technology adoption is ambiguous for the period prior 
to 1950. In order to test how tariffs affected efficiency growth for our larger dataset (that has 
the advantage of including a number of Latin American countries) we use average tariff rates 
from the Clemens and Williamson (2004) dataset. The tariffs are measured as the share of 
customs revenues (import duties only) in total import values. Figure 5 shows the average tariff 
rates in 1929 and 1938 for a majority of the countries in our dataset.  
Another big source of market distortions was the Second World War. What happened 
to those countries that had particularly high blood loss? Or that participated longest in the 
Second World War and other major conflicts between 1929 and 1949? Was there a special 
efficiency loss among the losers of wars? Did geographic location and being outside Europe, 
where a large share of the war activity took place, matter for efficiency growth?  
We model those questions by considering the log number of battle deaths per pre-war 
population,  the  log  number  of  war  days  per  country  in  this  period,  a  dummy  variable 
indicating whether a country lost any war during this period, and a dummy variable if the 
country was situated outside of Europe. The data concerning the war variables were taken 
from  the  Correlates  of  War  Dataset  (www.correlatesofwar.org).  We  assume  that  all those 
factors were detrimental for economic efficiency, and we argue that if a country lost a war, 
but won others, the losing effect was stronger. Japan would be an example here.  
Apart from the variables that measure impediments to the function of international 
markets,  there  are  a  number  of  internal  factors  that  may  hamper  efficiency  growth,  for 
example civil wars. We added a dummy variable for civil war conflicts during this period 
(such as the Spanish civil war).   18 
We  also  imagine  that  domestic  price  volatility  would  have  strong  effects  on 
uncertainty, making an efficient choice of the most appropriate production plan more difficult. 
Hence,  we  analyze  the  effect  of  internal  economic  turbulence  by  adding  a  pricevolatility 
variable that captures the ration between the highest and lowest recorded price during the 
investigated time period. Price data are taken from Mitchell. 
A  large  recent  literature  has  also  focused  on  the  contributions  of  a  stable  and 
competent state as a contributing factor to economic growth. Bockstette et al. (2002) have 
compiled a comprehensive data set of state institutions. They were particularly interested in 
the antiquity of states, interpreting the efficiency of governance institutions as function of the 
experience a certain country had with governments in history. For example, China and Italy 
had  long  run  experiences  with  state  organization,  whereas  Zambia  had  only  recently 
developed government institutions which covered a large share of its territory. The authors 
find that the antiquity of states has a strong positive impact on the 1960-90 growth rates, 
ceteris paribus. While we imagine that state antiquity could have had a positive impact on 
efficiency  growth  in  the  interwar  and  war  period,  we  would  also  formulate  the 
counterhypothesis: Countries with a historically strong national government might be more 
involved  in  the  war  conflicts  of  the  Second  World  War,  mobilizing  more  resources  for 
warfare.  More  decentralized  and  newly  settled  countries  might  on  the  other  hand  be  less 
involved, and a smaller share of their resources can be mobilized for warfare.  
Finally, inspired by the concept of social capability as a source of catch-up and, we are 
interested in the social and institutional factors that may facilitate the diffusion and adoption 
of  technologies.  For  the  post-war  period  Toniolo  (1998)  has  convincingly  argued  that  a 
favourable ratio of human capital to physical capital was conducive for European catch-up 
with the USA during the Golden Age. Toniolo argues that USA as a technological leader was 
long characterized by a much higher capital to labour ratio than the rest of the world. The   19 
difference increased due to the Second World War, since countries on the Continent suffered 
considerable  losses  in  industrial  plants  and  public  capital.  However,  since  schools  and 
universities continued to function rather well the difference in human capital levels was not as 
large as it was in physical capital between USA and the rest of the world. This gap between 
potential output and actual output per worker, measured as the relative ratio of human capital 
to  physical  capital  is  a  typical  condition  favourable  for  catch-up  growth  and  efficiency 
increases. We are interested in examining whether this hypothesis can also be verified as a 
source of catching up in the inter-war period. As the First World War resulted in losses in 
physical  capital  simultaneously  with  the  educated  cohorts  born  in  the  early  20
th  century 
entering  into  the  labour  force,  we  hypothesise  that  countries  with  relatively  high  human 
capital to physical capital in 1925 were generally more likely to experience the “brain to 
capital gap” and efficiency catch-up with USA as the technological leader. We measure the 
propensity for “brain to capital gap” as the ratio between the number of school years in 1925 
and the capital stock in 1929. A frequent problem wth ratios is that one variable has a much 
larger variance, hence the overall variance is determined by this variable. For example, if you 
calculate the ratio of literacy and GDP, and literacy would always be 100%, then all the 
variation in the ratio variable would come from GDP. In order to avoid this problem, we used 
the log of capital stock, and standardized both variables to an index between 0 (=minimum 
value) and 100 (maximum), before calculating the ratio. 
Many of the above-mentioned variables are only available for a subset of countries 
between 1929 and 1950. Hence we can only perform exploratory regressions that cannot take 
all  possible  determinants  into  account.  In  the  following,  we  will  focus  on  cross-sectional 
regressions.  We  considered  whether  to  transform  our  data  set  into  a  panel  format,  and 
estimate  fixed  effects,  in  order  to  avoid  the  usual  problems  of  unobserved  heterogeneity. 
However, at least two counter-arguments prevent us from chosing a FE specification: first of   20 
all, most of our explanatory variables are time-invariant, hence they would drop out of a 
simple  FE  approach.  Secondly  and  more  important,  growth  panel  analyses  with  FE 
approaches have been criticised, as they put so much more emphasis on the variation over 
time, and ignore mostly the variation between countries (Durlauf 2005). The variation over 
time  though,  it  has  been  argued,  is  more  likely  to  be  distorted  by  measurement  error, 
compared to the variation between countries. This is especially true when it comes to factors 
as hard to measure as human capital, and institutions. 
The regression results are found in Table 3. Model I to III refer to the whole time 
period, whereas models IV to VI focus specifically on the most turbulent war years 1939-
1950.  First  of  all,  it  is  evident  from  the  table  that  the  brain  to  capital  gap  variable  is 
significantly and positively related to efficiency growth in all six regressions. Thus, countries 
that  had  a  relatively  high  human  capital  to  capital  ratio  in  1925  (“brain  to  capital  gap”) 
achieved higher efficiency growth in subsequent periods, no matter whether we focus on the 
war  years  or  on  the  full  sample  period.  This  variable  is  not  only  statistically,  but  also 
economically significant: a standard deviation change in the brain to capital gap is 0.35 (Table 
4). Such a change would imply an efficiency change of 0.12 (using the coefficient of Model 
I). This is a substantial proportion of the overall standard deviation of the efficiency change 
between 1929 and 1950, which is 0.27. 
In contrast, protectionism measured as average tariff rates apparently did not play a 
strong role for efficiency growth, as the coefficient of variable is insignificant in the first 
model.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the  Collins  and  Williamson  (2001)-argument  about 
ambiguous tariff effects prior to 1950. In model II we include the state antiquity variable but 
find that this variable cannot explain efficiency growth in our time period.  
However,  the  other  market  distortion  and  turbulence  variables  receive  stronger 
support. Market distortions measured as the effects of war is significant with the expected   21 
sign in different combinations in most models. Losing one war has a negative effect for the 
full period in model III when we do not control for tariffs and the war durations is negatively 
related to efficiency growth for the war years 1938-50. However, the blood toll was not a 
significant contribution to efficiency decrease (Model VI).  
From all six model specifications we find that starting a civil war appears to have been 
a very consistent and significant method of ruining a country’s efficiency. Again, not only 
statistical, but also economic significance is clearly given. Being outside of Europe where 
most of the battles took place also appears to have had a positive impact on efficiency in most 
models. 
Finally, price volatility in 1929-38 had the expected negative impact on efficiency 
growth in all specifications, apart from the first model in which we control for tariffs but are 
restricted  to  27  observations.  Statistical  significance  is  given  for  the  1938-50  efficiency 
change. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
We have employed a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting for 41 countries during 
the inter-war and war years 1929 to 1950. We have shown that inclusion of human capital to 
the production function modifies growth accounting results (a level effect of human capital). 
The majority of the sample countries improve in efficiency after human capital was included 
especially for later period. This is a sign that low levels of human capital partly explain the 
estimated inefficiency and that the effect was growing with time. Adding human capital also 
cut the relative contribution of technological change (shifts in the production frontier) by a 
third on average in the sample.    22 
However,  the  countries  that  were  determining  the  technological  frontier  were  not 
affected by controlling for human capital, indicating that the leading countries were fully able 
to utilize their human capital levels in the production process.  
Looking at the relative contributions of changes in efficiency, technology and human 
capital  accumulation  using  the  decomposition  method  shows  a  slightly  different  picture. 
Although  the  growth  effects  from  human  capital  increases  were  large  in  magnitude,  the 
countries that showed the largest contributions from human capital increases were not the 
same as the countries that had the strongest labour productivity growth during the time period. 
Instead, it appears that the possibility to move towards the production frontier and increase 
efficiency was more important in explaining productivity growth during the interwar and war 
years. This finding shows that much of the productivity increases in the inter-war period 
stemmed  from  the  forces  of  catching-up,  perhaps  due  to  the  successful  adoption  of  the 
technologies  from  the  late  19
th  century  (electricity,  combustion  engine,  factory  mode  of 
production) and the possible effects of brain to capital gap due to capital destruction in the 
First  World  War  and  human  capital  investments  at  the  turn  of  the  century.  The  growth 
contributions from countries catching-up with the technological frontier also underlines the 
importance  of  adding  the  notion  of  inefficiency  into  the  growth  accounting  framework, 
especially when technological change and factor accumulation is limited and distorted by the 
effects of war.  
Explaining the efficiency changes with the use of regression analysis confirms this 
view. Countries with long war duration, civil wars and countries that lost wars exhibit lower 
efficiency improvements, or even declining efficiency. On the contrary, having a high initial 
level of human capital before the war relatively to the capital stock appears to have created a 
gap between actual and potential output that was had similar favourable effects for catching-
up in terms of efficiency increases as we have seen for the post World War 2 period.    23 
Thus, exogenous global phenomena as wars certainly matter for productive efficiency, 
but we find strong level effect from human capital on both productivity growth and efficiency 
growth as well. Hence, we need to distinguish between growth effects and level effects of 
human  capital.  Growth  effects  influenced  labour  productivity  directly,  but  only  modestly 
during this period, whereas the level effects impacted of countries ability to catch-up with the 
technological leaders and thus indirectly on labour productivity. This result is robust even in 
times of turbulence and death.   
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Table 1. Efficiency indices 
  1929  1950 
  WITHOUT HC  WITH HC  WITHOUT HC  WITH HC 
    ar  1.00  1.00  0.71  0.83 
    at  0.57  0.52  0.41  0.40 
    au  0.84  0.75  0.83  0.84 
    be  0.68  0.74  0.65  0.70 
    bg  0.50  0.46  0.25  0.23 
    br  0.58  0.60  0.44  0.51 
    ca  0.83  0.78  0.90  0.90 
    ch  1.00  0.87  1.00  1.00 
    cl  0.78  0.90  0.67  0.79 
    cn  0.31  0.32  0.16  0.16 
    co  0.76  0.75  0.53  0.54 
    cr  0.56  0.56  0.43  0.49 
    cu  0.36  0.40  0.35  0.40 
    de  0.74  0.68  0.48  0.49 
    dk  0.86  0.81  0.76  0.83 
    es  0.73  0.71  0.37  0.39 
    fi  0.81  0.82  0.53  0.59 
    fr  0.66  0.59  0.59  0.65 
    gr  0.94  0.91  0.43  0.43 
    gt  0.60  0.59  0.44  0.50 
    hu  0.47  0.45  0.30  0.35 
    id  0.69  0.73  0.37  0.38 
    in  0.42  0.44  0.23  0.24 
    it  0.80  0.78  0.66  0.67 
    jp  0.42  0.41  0.31  0.29 
    lk  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.49 
    mx  0.49  0.54  0.48  0.65   29 
    ni  0.62  0.63  0.35  0.42 
    nl  1.00  1.00  0.80  0.88 
    no  0.60  0.57  0.68  0.71 
    nz  0.85  0.75  0.99  0.97 
    pl  0.33  0.31  0.26  0.30 
    pt  0.53  0.53  0.45  0.51 
    ro  0.22  0.22  0.15  0.17 
    se  0.59  0.53  0.72  0.83 
    th  1.00  1.00  0.62  0.62 
    tr  0.63  0.67  0.32  0.32 
    uk  0.81  0.88  0.74  0.80 
    us  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
    uy  0.93  0.95  1.00  1.00 
    za  0.28  0.39  0.41  0.59 
mean  0.68  0.67  0.54  0.58 
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Table 2 Decomposition results 1929-1950 
  Prod change  EFF-1*100  TECH-1*100  KACC-1*100  HACC-1*100 
ar  10.34  -16.77  11.70  -1.23  20.16 
    -29.12  30.96  18.87  x 
at  0.04  -23.94  13.68  -54.19  152.55 
    -27.98  33.42  4.10  x 
au  32.48  11.86  15.20  -0.38  3.20 
    -0.74  28.35  3.98  x 
be  25.41  -6.17  20.22  -16.22  32.70 
    -3.34  28.47  0.99  x 
bg  25.51  -49.91  36.14  -42.30  218.97 
    -51.24  42.47  80.67  x 
br  57.83  -15.63  40.90  -8.68  45.40 
    -20.90  49.31  33.63  x 
ca  53.84  14.82  21.46  -5.78  17.07 
    7.64  28.57  11.16  x 
ch  41.94  14.59  13.56  20.85  -9.74 
    0.00  30.92  8.41  x 
cl  15.60  -12.10  13.63  -10.67  29.56 
    -14.36  30.84  3.17  x 
cn  -21.92  -49.16  27.14  -77.30  432.28 
    -48.09  29.41  16.24  x 
co  96.22  -27.69  26.07  95.73  9.96 
    -24.44  16.33  123.24  x 
cr  24.12  -13.59  17.61  -36.27  91.64 
    -23.96  34.29  21.56  x 
cu  23.18  1.59  13.66  -54.60  134.98 
    -3.95  30.58  -1.79  x 
de  -13.72  -28.16  14.35  -37.17  67.18 
    -16.15  12.66  -8.66  x   31 
dk  19.00  2.12  13.68  -3.53  6.26 
    -11.56  29.69  3.75  x 
es  -23.51  -44.76  16.04  -51.51  146.06 
    -50.20  30.72  17.49  x 
fi  46.27  -28.26  28.27  -8.07  72.89 
    -35.67  42.68  59.36  x 
fr  16.28  9.76  13.57  -32.92  39.05 
    -10.09  28.26  0.84  x 
gr  -4.56  -53.00  42.30  -21.53  81.86 
    -55.13  50.29  41.55  x 
gt  21.18  -15.69  20.97  -28.58  66.37 
    -23.63  32.31  19.92  x 
hu  0.59  -21.31  15.71  -55.43  147.86 
    -35.72  30.93  19.51  x 
id  -28.32  -47.25  25.19  -48.66  111.43 
    -46.66  24.49  7.95  x 
in  -14.82  -45.42  30.76  -63.74  229.20 
    -44.69  30.43  18.07  x 
it  32.70  -13.07  30.89  -9.46  28.81 
    -12.83  40.58  8.28  x 
jp  3.23  -27.58  21.88  -65.93  243.24 
    -27.71  30.67  9.29  x 
lk  -6.19  -50.73  1.65  -3.78  94.66 
    -50.34  16.52  62.12  x 
mx  41.92  19.25  13.64  -24.93  39.49 
    -2.72  29.58  12.58  x 
ni  -7.67  -33.57  17.11  -46.02  119.86 
    -44.28  35.52  22.27  x 
nl  6.20  -11.62  14.36  3.46  1.56 
    -19.74  28.28  3.14  x   32 
no  45.31  24.74  13.56  -20.07  28.34 
    12.74  32.45  -2.69  x 
nz  50.93  29.47  13.35  10.40  -6.84 
    16.84  28.27  0.71  x 
pl  22.79  -2.55  13.09  -67.06  238.24 
    -22.06  27.62  23.46  x 
pt  95.71  -2.39  35.01  2.25  45.24 
    -16.32  46.31  59.85  x 
ro  28.55  -24.61  34.32  -75.74  423.19 
    -34.79  48.55  32.69  x 
se  82.56  57.18  12.32  0.70  2.69 
    23.30  27.53  16.10  x 
th  6.39  -37.70  -5.97  4.25  74.22 
    -37.91  0.00  71.36  x 
tr  4.96  -51.65  28.93  -32.70  150.16 
    -49.62  30.45  59.70  x 
uk  16.98  -9.46  21.72  -21.14  34.62 
    -9.41  28.52  0.48  x 
us  36.67  0.00  27.84  5.19  1.64 
    0.00  32.62  3.05  x 
uy  20.82  5.81  33.15  13.52  -24.46 
    7.43  47.31  -23.65  x 
za  100.20  49.44  18.07  -26.67  54.74 
    45.19  29.48  6.49  x 
mean  24.03  -12.76  20.41  -21.85  90.15 
    -19.32  31.38  21.20  x 
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Table 3. Regression results. Dependent variable is efficiency growth:  
Model  I 1929-50  II 1929-50  III 1929-50  IV 1938-50  V 1938-50  VI 1938-50 
   Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
Tariffs 1929 
and 1938  0.38  0.63                     
State 
Instititutions      -0.16  0.47                 
Lose one war 
dummy  -0.18  0.10  -0.14  0.25  -0.20  0.03  -0.13  0.09         
Log battle 
deaths per 1000 
pop.                  0.00  0.94     
Log war 
duration                      -0.02  0.03 
Civil War 
Dummy  -0.29  0.01  -0.29  0.01  -0.30  0.01  -0.24  0.01  -0.23  0.01  -0.24  0.00 
Brains to capital  0.33  0.03  0.28  0.03  0.25  0.03  0.21  0.02  0.21  0.05  0.23  0.01 
Non Europe 
Dummy  0.04  0.66  0.05  0.67  0.12  0.16  0.14  0.04  0.17  0.02  0.18  0.01 
Price volatility 
1929-38  -0.19  0.36  -0.13  0.20  -0.14  0.11  -0.16  0.03  -0.18  0.02  -0.20  0.01 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, regression variables 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Efficiency  Growth 
1929-50  41  0.87  0.27  0.47  1.57 
Efficiency  Growth 
1938-50  41  0.89  0.22  0.45  1.32 
Tariffs 1929 and 1938  29
1  0.17  0.06  0.07  0.27 
State Instititutions  36
2  0.56  0.28  0.12  1.00 
Lose one war dummy  41  0.22  0.42  0.00  1.00 
Log battle deaths per 
1000 pop.  41  0.42  1.89  -5.93  3.93 
Log war duration 
(months)  41  3.75  3.52  0.00  8.43 
Civil War Dummy   41  0.17  0.38  0.00  1.00 
Brains to capital  40
3  0.62  0.35  0.00  1.28 
Non Europe Dummy  41  0.51  0.51  0.00  1.00 
Price volatility 1929-38  37
4  1.45  0.44  1.06  3.61 
1 Tariff data lacking for be, bg, ch, cr, fi, gt, ni, nl, pl, ro, tr, za 
2 Data lacking for hu, cu, bg, pl, ro 
3 Thailand was excluded since its capital stock was more than 100 times smaller than any other capital stock in 
the sample. 
4 Data lacking for th, lk, ni, cr     35 
 
Figure 1. No Human capital inclusion. Technical frontiers in 1929 and 1950, capital and output per worker. 1000’s of 
international 1990 US dollars 
 
 
Figure 2. Human capital inclusion Technical frontiers in 1929 and 1950, capital and output at efficiency units of 
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Appendix A. Physical and human capital stocks 
 
A1: Energy based capital stocks 1929-1950: 
First we estimate the relationship between the log of energy consumption per worker and the 
non-residential physical capital stock from Penn World tables for 46 countries in 1965, which 
is the earliest year that we have data on standardised capital stocks and energy consumption 
for a large number of countries. The following regression was estimated:  
Log (capital/worker) = 13.2+0.77*Log(energy/worker)+0.74*Belgium + e  
We  add  a  dummy  for  Belgium-Luxemburg  in  1965,  since  the  capital  stock  of  Belgium-
Luxemburg  is  very  large  in  the  PWT  5.6,  probably  due  to  the  specific  nature  of  the 
Luxemburgian economy. The regression has an adjusted R squared of 0.78. Figure 4 shows 
that there was a very close correlation between the log of capital stock per worker and the log 
of energy consumption in 1965 for the 46 countries. 
We use the estimated relationship between energy consumption and capital to predict 
historical capital per worker series for our sample of 41 countries for which we have historical 
energy consumption data (Darmstadter: 1971) for the benchmark years 1929, 1938 and 1950.  
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Figure 4. The log of energy consumption and capital stock per worker in 1965 for a sample of 46 countries. 
Energy consumption is measured in kilograms of coal equivalents per worker (Darmstadter 1971). The physical 
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Table 4 shows that our capital stocks grow at similar rates as the non-residential capital 
stock per worker and per efficiency unit of worker provided in Maddison (1995) for US, UK 
and  Japan  for  the  three  benchmark  years.  The  table  also  shows  that  capital  growth  per 
efficiency unit of worker was very modest between 1929 and 1950, both using our capital and 
the Maddison capital stocks.  
 
Table 4. Growth in capital stock per worker and efficiency unit of worker 1929-1950 
Growth in K/L  USA  UK  Japan  Growth in K/eL  USA  UK  Japan 
Maddison  1.05  1.08  1.58  Maddison  0.98  1.02  1.36 
Enflo & Baten  1.24  1.03  1.18  Enflo & Baten  1.15  0.96  1.01 
 
A2: Human capital augmentation factors 1925-1945:  
In order to calculate the human capital augmentation factors as suggested by Hall and Jones 
(1999) we need the average number of school years in the population of every country. For 
this, we used the close correlation between the amount of primary and secondary schooling, 
and the average number of school years of the labour force 25  years later, using Barro’s 
schooling  data.  The  adjusted  R-Square  in  a  regression  of  school  years  on  primary  and 
secondary schooling is 0.84, and this relationship is relatively time-invariant. Hence, we argue 
that the number of school years can be estimated based on Barro’s schooling data as (the 
constant of –0.1267 was not statistically significant): 
school yearst = 4.2328*Primary schoolingt-25 + 7.6492* Secondary schoolingt-25  
We use this relationship to estimate the average number of schooling in the population of our 
41 countries using Lindert (2006) and Labuske and Baten (2006) data on schooling for the 
benchmark years 1925, 1935 and 1945. Thereafter, we followed the strategy of Hall and Jones 
(1999) to calculate augmentation of labour force income by human capital, by using Mincer 
equation results. Those (reviewed in Psacharopoulos 1994) indicate that each of the first four   40 
years of schooling augment the income by 13.4%, the next four years 10.1%, and years of 
schooling beyond that 6.8%.  
 
 
Figure 5. Human capital augmentation factors in 1925 and 1945. 
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